

## Modernization and Pesantren Based Community Development in Indonesia

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**Abstract:** *Community development in the pesantren was initiated by Muslim activists who joined LP3ES and P3M in response to the excess of top-down Modernization (Developmentalism) of the New Order. Through these NGOs the activists strengthened the pesantren to become agents of community development at the grass root level. It is argued that despite the fact that LP3ES and P3M provided the pesantren with participatory methods absent from the top-down New Order development model, they share the Modernization paradigm with the New Order. This paradigm focuses more on service delivery and fails to offer an alternative for achieving macro social and political transformation.*

**Keywords:** *Pesantren, Ccommunity Development, the New Order, Modernization.*

**Abstrak:** *Pengembangan masyarakat di pesantren diprakarsai oleh para aktivis Muslim yang bergabung dengan LP3ES dan P3M sebagai tanggapan terhadap kelebihan modernisasi top-down (Developmentalism) Orde Baru. Melalui LSM-LSM ini para aktivis memperkuat pesantren untuk menjadi agen pengembangan masyarakat di tingkat akar rumput. Dikatakan bahwa terlepas dari kenyataan bahwa LP3ES dan P3M memberi pesantren metode partisipatif yang tidak ada dalam model pembangunan Orde Baru yang top-down, mereka berbagi paradigma modernisasi dengan Orde Baru. Paradigma ini lebih berfokus pada pemberian layanan dan gagal menawarkan alternatif untuk mencapai transformasi sosial dan politik makro.*

**Kata Kunci:** *Pesantren, Pengembangan Masyarakat, Orde Baru, Modernisasi.*

## A. Introduction

Since the late 1970s community development has been promoted by non-government organisations in Indonesia such as LP3ES (*Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial*). Such organisations have sought to redress the failure of top-down Modernization of the New Order government as a strategy to bring about equality in economic prosperity. Despite the fact that Indonesia's economy grew at 8.0 percent annually in the period of 1965-1980,<sup>1</sup> and at 5.1 percent during 1980-1988,<sup>2</sup> the New Order Modernization denied equality in sharing the process and product of development and denied politically meaningful participation in development.<sup>3</sup> LP3ES used the *pesantren* as an entry point to promote a participatory approach to social and economic development. The *pesantren*'s capacity to stimulate social mobilisation in pursuit of other purposes was seen as an important asset to the implementation of community development.

This article will discuss the paradigm of community development in the *pesantren*. This article argues that despite the fact that LP3ES and P3M provided the *pesantren* with participatory methods absent from the top-down New Order development model, they share the Modernization paradigm with the New Order. This paradigm focuses more on service delivery and fails to offer an alternative for achieving macro social and political transformation. The first section explains the New Order Modernization and examines the emergence of LP3ES and P3M, exploring their role in the origin of community development in the *pesantren*. The second section deals with the paradigm developed by LP3ES and P3M in the implementation of community development in the *pesantren*.

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<sup>1</sup>World Bank, *World Development Report 1991: Poverty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 180.

<sup>2</sup>Arief Budiman, "The emergence of the Bureaucratic Capitalist State in Indonesia," dalam *Reflections on Development in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), 127.

<sup>3</sup>Purwo Santoso, "Political Chalanges to Sustainable Development in Indonesia" (MA Thesis, UMI Dissertation Service, 1992), 121–37.

## B. The New Order Modernization

When the military New Order regime under Soeharto came to power in 1967, replacing the Old Order regime of President Soekarno, the regime focused on Modernization to remedy many ills besetting the nation. These were perceived to be political instability, economic collapse, and misuse of state doctrines; the *Pancasila* and constitution of 1945.<sup>4</sup> The new regime then introduced the ideas of pragmatism, de-ideologisation, depoliticisation and development (*pembangunan*). Economic development was needed to direct people's attention away from politics and towards the economy and to change the national slogan from 'politics as commander' as practised by the old regime to 'economy as commander'.<sup>5</sup> Under the jargon of *pembangunan*, developmentalism became a new official orthodoxy signified by the establishment of Kabinet Pembangunan I (Development Cabinet I, June 1968-March 1973).

The dominant concept of developmentalism applied by the New Order reflects western paradigms of development, that is, a kind of stage-by-stage movement towards 'higher modernity' in the forms of technology and economic advance (idea of progress).<sup>6</sup> Modernization advocates the process by which so-called traditional structures and societies are transformed into more modern types, along a developmental trajectory mirroring the earlier reforms of the European Industrial Revolution. Modernization encompasses secularisation, commercialisation, industrialisation, increasing material standard of living, diffusion of literacy, education, mass media, national unification, and the expansion of popular involvement in participation.

With the assistance of 'Berkeley Mafia', the New Order regime adopted the modernization theory introduced by WW Rostow in his book *The Stage of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist*

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<sup>4</sup>Douglas Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and The Ideology of Tolerance* (London: Routledge, 1995), 23-25.

<sup>5</sup>Fachri Ali dan Bahtiar Effendy, *Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: Rekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Masa Orde Baru* (Bandung: Mizan, 1986), 94-95.

<sup>6</sup>Bjorn Hettne, *Development Theory and The Three Worlds: Towards an International Political Economy of Development* (New York: Longman Scientific and Technical, 1995), 49-57.

*Manifesto*.<sup>7</sup> This theory uses the metaphor of growth in an organism to explain modernization. In this case, development is seen from an evolutionary perspective as a journey from 'traditional to modern'. The assumption here is that all societies were once alike (traditional), and that the Third World will also pass through the same set of changes as experienced in the West to eventually become 'modern'. Rostow argues that development will flow almost automatically from capital accumulation. As savings are invested in productive activities, capital accumulates. This process leads to economic growth. The most intense activity, and hence the greatest contribution to economic growth, is generated by the industrial sector. This is obvious from the series of Indonesian five-year development plans (*Repelita*) in which industrialisation became the driving force.<sup>8</sup>

Modernization of the New Order was also based on the theories introduced by David McClelland and Inkeles and Smith. McClelland based his theory on Weber, arguing that if the Protestant Ethic caused economic growth in the West, then some analogous phenomenon must be sought in other places in order to achieve economic growth. What lay behind Weber's theory, McClelland argues, is a personality trait, 'the need for achievement' (N-Ach). The reason why people in the Third World countries, including Indonesia, are underdeveloped is because they have a low sense of this need for achievement (traditional mentality and belief in predetermination).<sup>9</sup>

Indonesia's economy grew at 8.0 percent annually in the period of 1965-1980,<sup>10</sup> and despite the global recession occurring in 1980-1988, it achieved 5.1 percent growth.<sup>11</sup> Apart from the industrial sector, which grew by 11.9 percent between 1965 and 1980 and by 5.1 percent in the 1980-1988 period, the upward surge of oil prices in the 1970s contributed to Indonesian economic development. In 1972,

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<sup>7</sup>See WW Rostow, *The Stage of Economic: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

<sup>8</sup>See Anne Booth, *Agricultural Development in Indonesia* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1988).

<sup>9</sup>Mansour Faqih, "The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Social Transformation: A Participatory Inquiry in Indonesia" (UMI Dissertation Service, 1995), 65.

<sup>10</sup>World Bank, *World Development Report 1991: Poverty*, 180.

<sup>11</sup>Budiman, "The emergence of the Bureaucratic Capitalist State in Indonesia," 127.

Indonesian crude sold for less than \$US 3 a barrel, but by 1980 the price increased to over \$US30. In the period 1970-81, export revenues from oil increased at a rate of 45.5 per cent. Oil and gas accounted for 37 per cent of total export revenue in 1970, and by 1981 this proportion had climbed to 82 per cent.<sup>12</sup>

Economic growth has improved people's well-being. People's life expectancy at birth rose from 41.2 years in 1960 to 61.5 years, the under five mortality rate dropped from 225 per 1,000 live births in 1960 to 100 in 1989, access to safe water increased from 11 percent of the population during 1975-1980 to 46 percent in 1988 and adult literacy increased from 54 percent in 1970 to 72 percent in 1985. This can be attributed to improvement in the combined primary and secondary enrolment ratio, which rose from 49 percent in 1970 to 84 percent in 1987. The real GDP per capita also increased from US\$490 in 1960 to US\$ 1,820 in 1988.<sup>13</sup>

This development, however, denied equality by failing to share the process and the product of development, and by excluding politically meaningful participation in development.<sup>14</sup> Inequality in development is an unavoidable situation, although there were some attempts to redistribute the fruit of development. There is no sign that inequality will end quickly, as Indonesia has implemented a structural adjustment program. This was done in response to the decline of oil and gas revenue in the early 1980s. As external debt increased liberalization of the economy, private big business groups were encouraged to gain more control of productive assets. In this context, Robison (1986) notes that economic development in the New Order has given rise to a number of very large and diversified domestic business groups. They are the only economic agents benefiting from the liberalisation measures which lead to conglomeration.<sup>15</sup> Spatial

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<sup>12</sup>Michael J. Vatikotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, Development, and Pressure for Change* (London: Routledge, 1994), 34-35.

<sup>13</sup>United Nation Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report 1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 127.

<sup>14</sup>Santoso, "Political Chalanges to Sustainable Development in Indonesia," 121-137.

<sup>15</sup>See Hal Hill, "Ownership in Indonesia: Who Owns What and Does It Matter?," dalam *Indonesia Assesment 1990*, ed. oleh Hal Hill, Terry Hull, dan Terry Hull (Canbera: Departement of Political and Social Change, Research School of Asia Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian University, 1990).

inequality between Java and outside Java also became an economic development problem. Despite the fact that most of the economic activities are concentrated in Java, this region has had the highest proportion of the population living below the poverty line. In West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java, the percentage of people living below the poverty line was 32.7%, 57.9%, 59.9%, 54.9% respectively.<sup>16</sup>

Although the People's Consultative Assembly of Indonesia has officially legitimised participation as essential to national development, its meaning has been distorted in the context of state-led development (top-down). Participation is not seen by the state as challenging its monopoly on decision making and is not in opposition to the state. Therefore, such participation discourages people from bargaining strongly for power *vis a vis* the state and, in turn, weakens Indonesian civil society. The development efforts are virtually out of the people's control and accordingly they are vulnerable to the abuse of the state power.<sup>17</sup> This indicates that participation is trivial because without it top-down development progresses anyway.<sup>18</sup>

### C. LP3ES and Community Development in the *Pesantren*

LP3ES and other Indonesian NGOs emerged in the 1970s in the context of a critique of national development strategy. These were created in reaction to the government approach to development, which was considered inadequate, top-down and non-participative. LP3ES was established in 1971 by intellectual and student reformers of the 1966 generation with support from German *Friedrich*

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<sup>16</sup>Hal Hill dan Anna Weidemann, "Regional Development in Indonesia: Pattern and Issues," dalam *Unity and Diversity: Regional Economic Development in Indonesia Since 1970*, ed. oleh Hal Hill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 42.

<sup>17</sup>Santoso, "Political Chalanges to Sustainable Development in Indonesia," 134.

<sup>18</sup>Colin MacAndrew, "Central Government and Local Development in Indonesia: An Overview," dalam *Central Government and Local Development in Indonesia*, ed. oleh Colin MacAndrew (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986), 9.

*Naumann Stiftung* (FNS).<sup>19</sup> The main concern of LP3ES was to counter the negative impact of development by offering alternatives. It also positioned itself as the state partner and as the mediating institution between the state and people. In advancing the development model with a more popular and human face, LP3ES first uses indigenous skills and resources; secondly, it focuses on redistribution and targeting towards meeting the basic needs of the masses; and thirdly, it develops strategies of popular participation for achieving these goals.<sup>20</sup>

The LP3ES socio-cultural background reflects part of a broad tradition of modernist Islam, with some patronage from technocrats associated with the former Socialist Party of Indonesia (PSI). Its network of members and associates has extensive links with major facets of Islamic life in Indonesia; hence, modernization and democratization of Islamic institutions have always formed part of its mission.<sup>21</sup> It was during the 1970s that the Muslim young generation involved in the Islamic renewal movement emerged to seek alternatives beyond the political arena in order to allow Islam to fulfil an important social role. They combined Islamic teachings, western social theories and the socio-political reality of Indonesian society. Therefore, the main agendas of this movement were re-actualisation of Islam in a modern context through renewal of Islamic thoughts, politics and bureaucracy.<sup>22</sup>

Realising the negative impact of national development, some Muslim activists of this renewal movement moved their focus to grass roots empowerment in rural areas. They were compelled to address the more tangible or immediate problems confronted by Indonesian society at large, the majority of which is Muslim, such as the socio-economic and political impacts of the regime's policy which puts too heavy an emphasis on stability and growth at the

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<sup>19</sup>LP3ES, *Program Latihan Pengembangan Masyarakat Desa Melalui Lembaga Tradisionil Pedesaan: Pesantren [unpublished paper]* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2001), xi-xii.

<sup>20</sup>Philip J. Eldridge, *Non-Government Organizations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), 87.

<sup>21</sup>Philip J. Eldridge, "Non-Governmental Organisation and the Role of State in Indonesia," 1988, 86-87.

<sup>22</sup>See Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State: The Transformation of Islamic Political Ideas and Practices in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2001).

expense of popular participation and distribution.<sup>23</sup> These activists viewed the New Order's development policies in light of the social transformative dimension of Islamic teachings and dependency theory. Their agenda was basically political--that is, the formation of a strong civil society *vis-à-vis* the state. Many activists, such as Dawam Rahardjo who joined LP3ES in the early 1970s, channeled such ideals through NGO (LSM) movements.

In the 1970s LP3ES used its links with the *pesantren* as an entry point for promoting more participatory approaches to social and economic development. Many urban activists had become aware of their lack of links with rural people, and saw this lack as weakening the support for, and legitimacy of, their struggles to effect change at higher levels of politics and decision making. Their *pesantren* program was basically intended to build capability and consciousness in the Muslim society at a grass roots level, leading towards the formation of an autonomous middle class as an important element in the development of a democratic political system. In other words, the long term goal of this program was to establish a cultural movement for democratization and social and political transformation at the national level.<sup>24</sup> Since the *pesantren* are largely identified as the educational institutions of traditionalist Islam, LP3ES was aware of the significance of cultivating co-operation with individuals associated with NU (*Nahdhatul Ulama*) as the organisation *par excellence* of Indonesia's Islamic traditionalism.

The cooperation between LP3ES and the *pesantren* resulted in the establishment of a new NGO in 1983, P3M (*Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren and Masyarakat*, the Indonesian Society for *Pesantren* and Community Development). The establishment of P3M was basically intended to channel the German FNS funds for at least the next ten years to continue the LP3ES *pesantren* program. The FNS did not fund particular projects for more than ten years.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>Effendy, 86-87.

<sup>24</sup>Eldridge, *Non-Government Organizations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia*, 92, 177; See also Mansour Faqih, "Pengembangan Masyarakat di Pesantren: Hambatan dan Permasalahan," dalam *The Impact of Pesantren in Education and Community Development in Indonesia*, ed. oleh Manfred Oepen dan Wolfgang Karcher (Jakarta: P3M, 1985), 153.

<sup>25</sup>Martin van Bruinessen, *NU: Tradisi, Relasi-Relasi Kuasa dan Pencairan Makna Baru* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1994), 246-247.



Both LP3ES and P3M continued to cooperate through training programs, forums and the distribution of each other's literature; therefore, P3M operationally inherited the ideology and methodology of community development applied by LP3ES in the *pesantren*.<sup>26</sup> To expand the involvement of the *pesantren* in community development, P3M established the *pesantren* network. In addition, through this network the *pesantren* could take over NGO roles in rural areas.<sup>27</sup>

The inclusion of the *pesantren* into the LP3ES program signaled the starting point for *pesantren* involvement in institutionalised community development. This was signified by the installation of a new organisation in the *pesantren* known as BPPM (*Biro Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat*, Bureau for *Pesantren* and Community Development). This innovation did not mean that the *pesantren* had never been involved in providing social services for villagers. Rather, the establishment of BPPM only changed the nature of the *pesantren* activity from sporadic to continuing and organized. BPPM was intended to serve as a local NGO which had the ability to organize and mobilize society to solve their local problems. It was also intended to ensure the continuation of development programs in the *pesantren*.<sup>28</sup>

#### **D. Paradigm of Community Development in *Pesantren***

In achieving the long term purpose of community development in the *pesantren* LP3ES did not always oppose policies initiated by the state. Instead, LP3ES preferred to work closely with the state, that is, relevant bureaucratic agencies, to implement programs,<sup>29</sup> seeking to cooperate and create dialogue with institutions in order to try and influence their policy (inside-in strategy). They argued that that the only way to transform government is to work

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<sup>26</sup>See also Eldridge, "Non-Governmental Organisation and the Role of State in Indonesia," 180; Faqih, "Pengembangan Masyarakat di Pesantren: Hambatan dan Permasalahan," 137.

<sup>27</sup>Faqih, "Pengembangan Masyarakat di Pesantren: Hambatan dan Permasalahan," 152.

<sup>28</sup>Erfan Maryono, "Aktualisasi Peran Kemasyarakatan Pesantren: refleksi Pengalaman LPSM," *Pesantren*, 1988, 34-41.

<sup>29</sup>Effendy, *Islam and the State: The Transformation of Islamic Political Ideas and Practices in Indonesia*, 88-89.

with the government and slowly produce change through education and negotiation.<sup>30</sup>

While working with grass roots people to provide direct services and basic resources, some CD NGOs also presented a fundamental challenge to political, economic, and patriarchal structure. This strategy is very different from the ‘outside-in’ strategy, which proposed change by putting pressure on institutions and people without actually engaging the particular target in dialogue. This strategy is employed by advocacy NGOs that foster a more radical approach to empowerment, and seek structural change that impacts upon power relations to produce collective empowerment at regional, national, and international levels. They avoid direct engagement with the government, preferring to challenge and confront the state. They have been involved in the pro-democracy movement, and anti-corruption and anti-debt campaigns, such as LBH, WALHI and INFID.<sup>31</sup>

Whitelum argues that the increased political repression of the New Order regime, especially in the mid 1970s, influenced NGOs such as LP3ES to adopt their paradigm.<sup>32</sup> The New Order only tolerated NGOs that endorsed charitable causes or the New Order Development agenda. With the decrease in oil revenues, the regime found that its development programs relied upon the efforts of NGOs to fund national development. Endorsing NGOs to achieve development objectives helped the New Order to maintain political stability, and attract foreign investment. This political climate allowed NGOs delivering various services such as health, education and small scale economic development to survive, increase in number and hamper the overtly political oriented NGOs.

However, the ‘inside-in strategy’ was vulnerable to being co-opted by the New Order government and caused structural problems. Such problems were faced also by donors when trying to engage the government in poverty alleviation work. The government’s political, economic and social structures were considered to be the core of the

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<sup>30</sup>Bernadette Whitelum, “Rhetoric and Reality in The World Bank’s Relations With NGOs: An Indonesian Case Study” (PhD Thesis, The Australian National University, 2003), 174-177.

<sup>31</sup>Whitelum, 174.

<sup>32</sup>Whitelum, 155.

problems disempowering the people. Involving the state in this work might serve to sustain the process of disempowerment.<sup>33</sup> Hulme and Edwards warn that NGO programs will be co-opted by the process of engagement, that they will cease being advocates for the people and instead become development contractors or implementers of donor or government programs.<sup>34</sup> The fear is that they will become tools of a development paradigm (top-down) they do not support.<sup>35</sup>

This is apparent in the case of LP3ES. Despite the fact that LP3ES promoted community development in the *pesantren* as an alternative to the top-down development model and as a means for social transformation, it was largely parallel to the government development paradigm (Modernization). Like other CD NGOs involved in development activities in the late 1970s, LP3ES did not introduce a radical alternative paradigm of development, but merely tried to ‘reform’ and reacted to the methodology and practices of the government development model, without questioning its basic assumption. They tended to neglect the problems of class exploitation, political oppression, gender bias, and the state’s cultural and ideological hegemony of development.<sup>36</sup> They regarded the theory of development supported by the government with the growth model translated in *Repelita* (five-year development plan) as good. What they found problematic was the approach and methodology: a top-down and non-participative approach to development. Therefore, the NGO’s task was to guide the people in generating knowledge, skills and attitudes with a view to becoming ‘modern’, and capable of ‘participation’ in development.

To begin with, LP3ES interest in the *pesantren* was based on the assumption that the *pesantren* was an effective instrument to disseminate development ideas and programs, and to mobilise local

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<sup>33</sup>Susan Higinbothan Holcombe, *Managing empower: The Grameen Bank's Experience of Poverty Alleviation* (London: Zed Book, 1995), 18.

<sup>34</sup>David Hulme dan Michael Edwards, “Scaling-Up the Developmental Impact of NGOs: Concepts and Experiences,” dalam *Making a Difference: NGOs and Development in a Changing World*, ed. oleh Michael Edwards dan David Hulme (London: Earthscan, 1994), 13-27.

<sup>35</sup>Whitelum, “Rhetoric and Reality in The World Bank’s Relations With NGOs: An Indonesian Case Study,” 193-194.

<sup>36</sup>Faqih, “The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Social Transformation: A Participatory Inquiry in Indonesia,” 113–18, 173.

resources and rural society for national development purposes.<sup>37</sup> Based on the seminar on Social Participation held by LP3ES and TEMPO weekly in Bogor in September 1971, LP3ES conducted a feasibility study to explore the possibility of utilising *pesantren* to stimulate social participation in national development (Maryono, 1988: 30-31). In this study the *pesantren*'s position in the village was examined and linked to village development, vocational training, and the creation of employment opportunities in agriculture, handicrafts and production units. The study concluded that the *pesantren* had the potential to induce social participation in rural society, and increase the success of national development.<sup>38</sup> As an institution growing from and within society, the *pesantren* had significant influence on rural society. This was palpable in its role in offering services such as traditional education to the villagers when modern education could not be accessed in rural areas. The *pesantren* also became the symbol of social and political countervailing to the oppressor, at times such as the Dutch colonial period. This was achieved by practising politics of isolation when villages were still free from the touch of political forces.<sup>39</sup> In short, the *pesantren* was the main social, cultural, and religious dynamic of traditional Muslim society.

The paradigm of community development in the *pesantren* was intended to transform the *pesantren* from a traditional to a modern institution, and was based on Modernization theory. It assumed that the backward mentality, behaviour and culture of people, such as the low level of their 'need for achievement' and other traditional values, prevented them from developing and growing. This backward mentality and values were considered to be the main cause of their lack of participation in development. Involving the *pesantren* in the LP3ES program constituted the 'salvation movement' from the negative impact of the New Order Modernization, which proceeded quickly and demanded radical changes in both way of life and institutions, from traditional to

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<sup>37</sup>MM. Billah, "Dari Paradigma Instrumentalist ke Paradigma Alternatif," *Pesantren*, 1988, 12-13.

<sup>38</sup>See Soedjoko Prasadjo, ed., *Profil Pesantren: Laporan Hasil Penelitian Pesantren Al-Fallah dan Delaoan Lainnya di Bogor* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982).

<sup>39</sup>Billah, "Dari Paradigma Instrumentalist ke Paradigma Alternatif," 290.

modern.<sup>40</sup> At that time, the *pesantren* was regarded as a traditional and rural institution which symbolised backwardness, resistance to the outside world, and a traditional lifestyle. The *pesantren* only focused on religious education (*tafaqquh fi al-din*) and produced graduates who did not have a great social impact within society: they could not respond appropriately to complex social problems beyond the religious sphere.<sup>41</sup> These internal shortages resulted in failure of the *pesantren* to support national development. The LP3ES program encouraged the *pesantren* to adjust itself to modernization and the villagers' demands, and helped the *pesantren* become a catalyst for rural development. The *pesantren*'s role would become greater, and its contribution to socio-cultural transformation would be more meaningful, once the *pesantren* could respond appropriately to society's problems. This could be achieved by alleviating poverty, eradicating social and economic gaps, and disseminating new relevant knowledge and technology. With these changes, the *pesantren* functioned not only as a traditional educational institution but also as (i) the centre for village training in development of knowledge, logical thinking, skills, and personal guidance for rural society, and (ii) a village-based, rural institution enhancing self-help belief with the aim of developing its environment economically, physically and spiritually.<sup>42</sup>

LP3ES programs in the *pesantren* almost replicated those that targeted small entrepreneurs, also developed by LP3ES. These development programs had focused on three major components: development of entrepreneurial skills and attitudes (AMT), transfer of appropriate technology and income generating activities. The latter activity replicated the Department of Religious Affairs' *pesantren* program in the early 1970s.<sup>43</sup> These projects were intended to motivate people to participate in small-scale economic development

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<sup>40</sup>M. Dawam Rahardjo, *Pergulatan Dunia Pesantren: Membangun dari Bawah* (Jakarta: P3M, 1985), xiii.

<sup>41</sup>MM. Billah, "Pemikiran Awal Pengembangan Pesantren," dalam *Pergulatan Dunia Pesantren: Membangun dari bawah*, ed. oleh M. Dawam Rahardjo (Jakarta: P3M, 1985), 294.

<sup>42</sup>Manfred Ziemek, *Pesantren Dalam Perubahan Sosial* (Jakarta: P3M, 1986), 213-215.

<sup>43</sup>Bruinessen, *NU: Tradisi, Relasi-Relasi Kuasa dan Pencairan Makna Baru*, 245.

as a means of increasing the welfare of the target group. LP3ES believed that the development process would work if capital was given to the right people: those highly motivated to achieve outcomes, with skills in the micro technology of business, such as marketing, accounting and financial management. These entrepreneurs would become the drivers of the growth process, and the rest of the community would benefit from the trickle down effect.<sup>44</sup>

During the cooperation between LP3ES/P3M and the *pesantren*, the latter only focused on the implementation of the development programs and neglected the underlying objective of such programs. In fact, none of the development programs in the *pesantren*, such as cooperatives, savings and loans, appropriate technologies, small scale industries and income generating activities, were the main objectives of community development. Rather, they were entry points to achieve the long term objective, namely, a cultural movement for democratisation and social transformation of the *pesantren* and rural society.<sup>45</sup> The NGO activists were reluctant to express to the *kyai* their true aims of the democratisation of the *pesantren* and of the village. LP3ES and P3M did not want the *kyai* to reject their programs, and they wanted to maintain good relationships with the *kyai* to ensure the sustainability of their projects in the *pesantren*. That is why technical and methodological issues were always raised in needs assessment discussions. Such issues included the need of the *pesantren* to participate in national development, but excluded discussion of the need for democratisation in the village.<sup>46</sup> In this context, Johnston<sup>47</sup> regards such NGOs as LP3ES as '*pengrajin social*' (social craftsmen) implying that their work demanded great effort and a high level of concentration to achieve even minimal changes in a very confined area. Their preference to work in a limited

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<sup>44</sup>Faqih, "Pengembangan Masyarakat di Pesantren: Hambatan dan Permasalahan," 117.

<sup>45</sup>Faqih, "The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Social Transformation: A Participatory Inquiry in Indonesia," 153.

<sup>46</sup>Faqih, 153.

<sup>47</sup>Marry Johnston, "Non-Government Organizations at The Crossroads in Indonesia," dalam *Indonesian Economic Development: Approaches, Technology, Small-Scale Textiles, Urban Infrastructure and NGOs*, ed. oleh RC. Rice (Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies: Monash University, 1990), 82.

number of small communities to improve their standard of life and dignity resulted in difficulties in promoting change at the national level.

## E. Conclusion

Community development in the *pesantren* was initiated by Muslim activists who joined LP3ES and P3M. Having been inspired by the social transformative dimension of Islamic teachings and dependency theory, these activists sought to empower grass root society who was facing the socio-economic and political negative impacts of the New Order development policy. This policy stressed stability and growth at the expense of people participation and even distribution. LP3ES and P3M efforts to use the *pesantren* as the entry point for promoting participatory approaches to social and economic development were intended not only to create people participation, but also to build capability and consciousness of Muslim society at grass roots level. This led to the formation of an autonomous middle class--an important instrument of democratization and social and political transformation. In other words, their agenda was basically political, that is, the formation of a strong civil society *vis-à-vis* the state.

LP3ES and P3M provided *pesantren* facilitators with knowledge of participatory methods, and training such as needs assessment, consciousness raising amongst the people, and Participatory Action Research (PAR). These were important parts of a broader strategy to stimulate people participation at the local level. However, there was inconsistency between the LP3ES paradigm and the long term objective of community development. While LP3ES intended to create social and political transformation through the *pesantren*, its 'inside-in strategy' and paradigm were strongly influenced by the Modernization assumption advocated by the New Order. Its intention to transform the *pesantren* life from traditional to 'modern' and to utilise the *pesantren* as an instrument to support the national development was reflected in its programs. Moreover, *pesantren* development programs were mainly concerned with service delivery (such as saving and loans, cooperatives and income generating) rather than advocacy activities. In addition, Participatory Action Research and 'radical' Freirean conscientisation were mixed

with modern Islamic theology and McClelland's N-Ach training to become transforming tools for modernity. The focus of LP3ES on service delivery, and its preference for working in a limited number of small communities to improve their living standard resulted in LP3ES becoming '*pengrajin social*' (social craftsmen), which limited its capacity to promote social and political transformation beyond the local context. [.]

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