



## The Dominance of Coalitions and the Weakening of the Opposition: Implications for the Principle of Checks and Balances Post-2019 Election

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Received: 2024-09-25

Revised: 2024-11-01

Accepted: 2024-01215

### Abstract

Indonesia, as a democratic state, requires the existence of an opposition to perform the functions of oversight, control, and criticism of the government. However, political realities reveal that many party elites prefer to form coalitions by placing their trusted allies in the cabinet rather than serving as the opposition. This study examines the state of coalitions and opposition in parliament following the 2019 General Election and their implications for the principle of checks and balances. It employs a normative method with a statutory and conceptual approach, analyzing secondary data comprising primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials descriptively. The findings indicate that major political parties that previously acted as opposition during the 2019 General Election joined the government coalition. This situation strengthened the government's position in formulating policies with minimal resistance. Conversely, the opposition seized this opportunity to secure positions within the government. Although the principle of checks and balances continues to function post-2019, it has proven ineffective due to the limited number of opposition parties. Consequently, government-proposed legislation is frequently passed without significant debate in parliament. This reality negatively impacts Indonesia's democracy, reducing the effectiveness of oversight over executive power. The study concludes that the dynamics of coalitions and opposition post-2019 General Election have weakened the principle of checks and balances, ultimately jeopardizing the quality of democracy in Indonesia.

**Keywords:** Democracy, Coalition, Opposition, Checks and Balance, 2019 Election



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## Introduction

Indonesia, as a nation that adopts a democratic system, still faces significant challenges in achieving a fully mature and functioning democracy. The existing democratic framework often provides considerable room for political practices that undermine the very essence of democracy. The establishment of a robust and ideal democracy requires continuous and periodic efforts. These efforts should follow specific phases until democracy evolves into a collective consciousness embraced by all societal groups, fostering its growth and development within the Indonesian community.<sup>1</sup>

One of the key components of democracy in Indonesia is the presence of an opposition. The existence of the opposition is essential, as it serves to oversee, monitor, and even critique the government, preventing the occurrence of abuse of power. However, in political practice, many party elites prioritize forming coalitions by appointing their trusted allies to cabinet positions rather than becoming part of the opposition.<sup>2</sup>

From the perspective of checks and balances, the opposition should not be viewed as a threat or a cause for concern. On the contrary, the opposition is vital to ensuring the sustainability of democratic governance. The primary purpose of political oversight by the opposition is to realign or correct government policies and practices that deviate from established norms, ensuring they remain consistent with the nation's ideological framework.<sup>3</sup>

The opposition is often defined as a force that monitors and critiques government policies deemed erroneous or misguided. It represents the actualization of differing opinions within society in the process of nation-building. Such differences of opinion are seen by wise individuals as a divine blessing, an indication of democratic progress. The crucial question is whether there is a willingness to accept differences of opinion—among individuals, societal groups,

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<sup>1</sup> Firman Noor, "Oposisi dalam Kehidupan Demokrasi: Arti Penting Keberadaan Oposisi Sebagai Bagian Penguatan Demokrasi di Indonesia," *Jurnal Masyarakat Indonesia* 42, no. 1 (2016): 2–3.

<sup>2</sup> Zaenuddin, *Prospek Gerakan Oposisi* (Jakarta: PT Raja Grafindo Persada, 2001) 2-3.

<sup>3</sup> Setiadi dan Usman Kolip, *Pengantar Sosiologi Politik* (Jakarta: Prenadamedia Group, 2015) 86.

citizens and the government, and, more specifically, between the opposition and those in power.

The willingness to critique and be critiqued, as well as the acceptance of differing opinions, serves as the key to unlocking the gates of democracy in Indonesia. According to political expert Arbi Sanit, the opposition is the cornerstone of a democratic system, and every democracy must have an opposition. While not all opposition groups are successful in upholding democracy, the absence of opposition threatens democracy, potentially leading to its demise. In a democratic system, those in power must be monitored and held accountable, as unchecked power tends to deviate from its intended purpose. Leaders can easily fall into the trap of abusing their authority, making it essential for the opposition to supervise and regulate their actions.<sup>4</sup>

In a democratic state, the roles and functions of all institutions must be equally strong and mutually controlling through the principle of checks and balances. However, when these institutions fail to function properly, operate inefficiently, or lack the authority to fulfill their roles, the result is often the dominance of greedy or extreme political parties that control and manipulate the governmental processes.<sup>5</sup>

Examining the dynamics of political coalitions and opposition in parliament post-2019 General Election, all major parties—such as PDI-P, Golkar, Nasdem, PKB, PPP, and most recently, Gerindra—joined the coalition supporting President Jokowi. This coalition controls 427 seats in the House of Representatives, leaving the opposition with only 148 seats. By comparison, the parliamentary composition in the previous term was more balanced: the coalition parties (PDI-P, Golkar, PKB, PPP, Nasdem, and Hanura) held 337 seats, while the opposition parties (Gerindra, Demokrat, PAN, and PKS) occupied 223 seats.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Zaenuddin, *Prospek Gerakan Oposisi* 2-3.

<sup>5</sup> M. Alief Akhbar PA.G dkk, "Analisis Dampak Sistem multipartai dalam Implementasi Sistem Pemerintahan Presidensi di Era Jokowi dan Jusuf Kalla," *Jurnal Social dan Government* 1, no. 1 (2020): 31.

<sup>6</sup> Andrea lidwina, "DPR dikuasai koalisi Jokowi," diakses 3 September 2021, di <https://databooks.katadata.co.id>.

The large number of participants in the coalition reflects the multitude of interests carried by each party representative,<sup>7</sup> aiming to secure victory in the political contest to achieve their objectives. This situation inevitably affects the implementation of the presidential system, as the president, serving both as head of state and head of government, must compromise with the coalition—from forming a working cabinet to developing policies—to avoid disruptions during their administration.<sup>8</sup>

The substantial coalition supporting President Jokowi's administration presents both advantages and risks. On the one hand, it eliminates the need for extensive lobbying in the legislature, as the majority of parliament members belong to pro-government political parties. On the other hand, it poses a significant threat to democracy, as the system of oversight and checks and balances risks becoming mere formalities. The remaining opposition's influence is likely to be suppressed by a mutually supportive government and parliament. Yet, the opposition is indispensable; without it, objective oversight of government policies by the parliament will cease to exist.

Several previous studies are relevant as references or comparisons. First, the research conducted by Firman Noor,<sup>9</sup> which focuses on the existence of the opposition as a means to strengthen democracy in Indonesia. His study covers the role of opposition within the democratic framework, its trajectory in Indonesia's political history, and the steps needed to build a robust opposition. Second, the research by Insan Harapan Harahap,<sup>10</sup> which focuses on the state of the opposition after the 2019 General Election and its impact on Indonesian democracy. The study examines three key aspects of democracy essential for maintaining a balance of power: the legislative, executive, and judiciary. Fifth, the research

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<sup>7</sup> M. Yasin al-Arif, "Anomali Sistem Pemerintahan Presidensial Pasca Amandemen UUD 1945," *Jurnal Hukum IUS QUIA IUSTUM* 22, no. 2 (2015): 238–54, <https://doi.org/10.20885/iustum.vol22.iss2.art4>.

<sup>8</sup> M. Alief Akhbar PA.G dkk, "Analisis Dampak Sistem Multipartai dalam Implementasi Sistem Pemerintahan Presidensial di Era Jokowi dan Jusuf Kalla" 31.

<sup>9</sup> Firman Noor, "Oposisi dalam Kehidupan Demokrasi: Arti Penting Keberadaan Oposisi Sebagai Bagian Penguatan Demokrasi di Indonesia."

<sup>10</sup> Insan Harapan Harahap, "Analisis Kondisi Oposisi Pasca Pemilu 2019 dan Pengaruhnya Terhadap Demokrasi Indonesia," *Artikel Universitas Bakrie*, 2021.

conducted by Munadi,<sup>11</sup> which explores the dynamics of opposition and coalition as reflections of Indonesia's democratic culture. His study delves into the definition and essence of political opposition, the concept of coalition, and the interplay between opposition and coalition in a democratic context. Third, the study by Asrinaldi A,<sup>12</sup> which examines parliamentary-style coalitions and their impact on the institutional strengthening of the presidential system in Indonesia. Fourth, the research conducted by Lili Romli,<sup>13</sup> yang fokus pada koalisi dan konflik internal partai politik pada era reformasi, yang kajiannya meliputi teori konflik, koalisi pemerintahan era reformasi, pilihan koalisi dan konflik internal partai politik.

which focuses on coalitions and internal conflicts within political parties during the reform era. His study addresses conflict theory, government coalitions in the reform era, coalition choices, and internal party conflicts.

## Research Method

This study employs a normative legal research approach, focusing solely on written legal regulations. Normative legal research, also referred to as doctrinal research, is commonly known as library research or document study.<sup>14</sup> Library research aims to gather data and information from resources available in libraries by reviewing books, literature, and analyzing various theories and perspectives related to the issues of coalition and opposition following the general election. This research is descriptive-analytical, intending to systematically and objectively describe the characteristics and relationships between existing elements. The analytical process involves organizing data in a sequence, structuring it into

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<sup>11</sup> Munadi, "Oposisi dan Koalisi: Potret Kultur Demokrasi Indonesia," *Jurnal Resolusi* 2, no. 1 (2019).

<sup>12</sup> Asrinaldi A, "Koalisi Model Parlementer dan Dampaknya pada Penguatan Kelembagaan Sistem Presidensial di Indonesia," *Jurnal Penelitian Politik* 10, no. 2 : 2013.

<sup>13</sup> Lili Romli, "Koalisi Model Parlementer dan Dampaknya pada Penguatan Kelembagaan Sistem Presidensial di Indonesia," *Jurnal Politika* 8, no. 2 (2017).

<sup>14</sup> m. Agus Santoso, "Kajian Tentang Manfaat Penelitian Hukum Bagi Pembangunan Daerah," *Yuriska : Jurnal Ilmiah Hukum* 3, no. 2 (oktober 2017): 1–22, <https://doi.org/https://Doi.Org/10.24903/Yrs.V3i2.177>.

patterns, categories, and basic descriptions, followed by comprehending, interpreting, and making sense of the data.<sup>15</sup>

The research employs a statutory approach and a conceptual approach. The data used consists of secondary data, including primary legal materials such as the Election Law, which was last amended by Law No. 7 of 2017; secondary legal materials such as research reports, journals, theses, dissertations; and tertiary legal materials, such as dictionaries.

Data collection is conducted through a literature review of primary, secondary, and tertiary materials. Once the relevant data is collected, it undergoes data processing through editing, coding, and systematizing. The processed data is then analyzed qualitatively using a deductive reasoning approach, starting from general concepts or facts and drawing specific conclusions.<sup>16</sup>

### **The State of Coalition and Opposition in Parliament Post-2019 General Election**

The 2019 legislative election placed nine political parties in the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR), with a total of 575 seats distributed as follows: the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) secured the most seats with 128, followed by Golkar with 85, Gerindra with 78, the National Democrat Party (Nasdem) with 59, the National Awakening Party (PKB) with 58, the Democrat Party with 54, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) with 50, the National Mandate Party (PAN) with 44, and the United Development Party (PPP) with 19<sup>17</sup>

The composition of the election results included a coalition supporting Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin, consisting of PDIP, Golkar, Nasdem, PKB, and PPP, which secured a total of 349 seats. A notable development occurred with the announcement of the Indonesia Maju Cabinet for the 2019–2024 period by President Jokowi: prominent figures from the opposition party, Gerindra, were

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<sup>15</sup> Kaelan, *Metode Penelitian Kualitatif Bidang Filsafat* (Yogyakarta: Paradigma, 2015) 58.

<sup>16</sup> Amirudin, Zainal Abidin, *Pengantar Metode Penelitian Hukum* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 2006) 89.

<sup>17</sup> “<https://www.bps.go.id/id/statistics-table/1/MTU3MyMx/hasil-penghitungan-suara-sah-partai-politik-peserta-pemilu-legislatif-tahun-1955-2019.html>,”.

appointed to key positions in the second Jokowi Cabinet.<sup>18</sup> In the Indonesia Maju Cabinet, Gerindra secured two ministerial positions, held by Prabowo Subianto and Edhy Prabowo, officially marking the party's entry into the government coalition. This decision was controversial, as Gerindra had previously been a key opposition party and vocal critic of the government during the election campaign and the previous administration. The party's shift to join the government coalition drew significant public attention. During Jokowi's previous term, the campaign often involved the exploitation of identity politics, particularly religious sentiment, which fueled political polarization within society. This polarization divided the public into two major groups based on differing political affiliations and loyalties.

Gerindra's decision to join the second Indonesia Maju Cabinet compromises its ability to effectively perform its role in maintaining checks and balances in parliament. As a former opposition party from the previous election cycle, Gerindra loses its opportunity to act as a counterbalance to the government. Moreover, the decision to join the government coalition may have been driven by a desire to gain access to power and government-funded projects.

Another contributing factor is the lack of clear financial sources for political parties. Political parties primarily rely on individual donations, whether from party cadres holding executive or legislative positions or from businesspeople affiliated with the party. Joining the coalition may have been seen as a strategic move to secure these critical resources and ensure financial sustainability.

A few years later, in 2021, the government coalition grew even larger and stronger with the inclusion of the National Mandate Party (PAN) and Zulkifli Hasan, who was appointed as Minister of Trade. This expansion brought the total number of pro-government seats in the DPR to 471 out of 575, representing 81.91%. Meanwhile, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the Democrat Party remained outside the government coalition.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> “Menteri kabinet jokowi jilid ii, <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20191023102611-4-109306/sah-ini-menteri-kabinet-jokowi-jilid-ii-kuy-intip-profilnya/2>,”.

<sup>19</sup> “<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/09/01/08024921/setelah-gerindra-kini-giliran-pan-gabung-koalisi-pendukung-pemerintah?page=all>,”.

The leadership composition of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) is dominated by pro-government parties. The Speaker of the DPR for the 2019–2024 term is Puan Maharani from the PDIP faction. The Deputy Speakers include Aziz Syamsuddin (later replaced by H. Lodewijk F. Paulus) from the Golkar faction, Sufmi Dasco Ahmad from the Gerindra faction, Rachmat Gobel from the Nasdem faction, and Muhaimin Iskandar from the National Awakening Party (PKB) faction.

This arrangement is based on Article 427D of Law No. 2 of 2018, which amended Law No. 17 of 2014 concerning the MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD (MD3). The law stipulates that the DPR leadership consists of one Speaker and four Deputy Speakers, appointed based on the order of the largest seat holders in the DPR. The Speaker must be a member of the party with the most seats, while the Deputy Speakers are drawn from parties with the second, third, fourth, and fifth highest seat counts in the DPR.<sup>20</sup>

Similarly, the organizational structure of the House of Representatives (DPR) for the 2019–2024 period has been established. PDIP secured three chairmanships of commissions Commission III, Commission IV, and Commission V along with the chairmanship of the Budget Committee and 11 deputy chair positions. Golkar followed with three chairmanships—Commission I, Commission II, and Commission XI—and 10 deputy chair positions. Nasdem also obtained three chairmanships—Commission VII, Commission IX, and eight deputy chair positions. The National Awakening Party (PKB) secured two chairmanships—Commission VI and Commission X along with seven deputy chair positions, while PAN gained one chairmanship Commission VIII and five deputy chair positions.

Gerindra, the Democratic Party, PKS, and PPP did not secure any commission chairmanships but still obtained chair and deputy chair positions in other parliamentary bodies. Gerindra received two chair positions in the Legislative Body (Baleg) and the Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation Body (BKSAP), as well as nine deputy chair positions. The Democratic Party secured

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<sup>20</sup> “<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/10/02/11494021/begini-proses-penetapan-pimpinan-dpr-masa-bakti-2019-2024>,”



two chair positions in the Household Affairs Body (BURT) and the State Finance Accountability Body (BAKN), along with four deputy chair positions. PKS obtained one chair position in the Ethics Council and six deputy chair positions. Meanwhile, PPP secured four deputy chair positions.<sup>21</sup>

The composition of the coalition and the distribution of chair and deputy chair positions in the DPR's supporting bodies have resulted in relatively calmer political dynamics compared to the previous DPR period. This is largely due to the fact that both the executive and legislative branches are predominantly operated by the same political machinery. On the positive side, this alignment allows the DPR to function more cohesively and in greater harmony with the government. However, on the downside, such a condition risks diminishing the DPR's role as a check on executive power, potentially undermining its oversight function.

The current composition of the DPR leans more toward functioning as part of the government coalition rather than as an opposition to it. According to Indonesian Law No. 17 of 2014, the DPR, through its oversight function, should ideally maintain a position of opposition to the government. This condition makes it challenging to effectively monitor and control the government's performance, as leadership roles and positions within DPR's supporting bodies (AKD) are evenly distributed among all parties in the DPR.

The public, however, expects the DPR to provide oversight and criticism of the government. The opposition is expected to offer alternative policies, making it essential that it retains a strong and consistent voice in critiquing the government. If the opposition successfully establishes itself as a credible and constructive check on the government, it could yield significant electoral benefits in future elections. Nonetheless, the current balance of coalition and opposition in the DPR remains subject to change, given the dynamic and fluid nature of Indonesian politics.

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<sup>21</sup> Debora Sanur, "Keberadaan Koalisi Dan Oposisi dalam Kinerja DPR RI 2019-2024, *Jurnal Parliamentary Review*" 1, no. 4 (Juni 2019): 166–67.

## **Implications of the Coalition and Opposition Dynamics in Parliament on Checks and Balances**

The existence and development of democracy in Indonesia remain incomplete, as political practices often undermine the essence of democracy. The strength of oligarchic or elitist tendencies clearly demonstrates that the exercise of power still lacks sufficient oversight, primarily due to the weakened role of the opposition, which is inherently tasked with providing such checks. This issue demands greater attention and constitutes a fundamental and urgent need to reduce oligarchic practices and their associated negative consequences. The need for a strong opposition is frequently linked to efforts to enhance the quality of democracy in Indonesia. Conceptually, democracy encompasses various schools of thought and perspectives, but it is ultimately viewed as the governance of the people's sovereignty. An effective opposition serves as a critical component in safeguarding this sovereignty, ensuring that democratic processes remain transparent, accountable, and reflective of the people's will.

The role of the opposition is crucial in ensuring that governance remains aligned with the interests of the people and promotes political participation, which is fundamental to upholding popular sovereignty and serves as a prerequisite for the existence of democracy. The foundation of the opposition lies in the concept of checks and balances, which ensures that branches of power do not operate solely to advance their own interests. Checks and balances enable various entities, both within the parliament and the executive, to regulate and remind one another, ensuring that governance stays in line with the will of the people. In addition to the concept of checks and balances, the principle of the separation of powers is equally significant to the role of the opposition. This principle underscores the need to prevent power from being concentrated in a single viewpoint, ensuring that there is a counterbalance to critique and challenge the actions of those in authority.<sup>22</sup>

The principle of checks and balances is a fundamental constitutional concept that requires the legislative, executive, and judicial branches to hold equal

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<sup>22</sup> Insan Harapan Harahap, "Analisis Kondisi Oposisi Pasca Pemilu 2019 dan Pengaruhnya Terhadap Demokrasi Indonesia" 7.

standing and mutually oversee one another. This principle ensures that state power is properly regulated, limited, and effectively monitored, thereby preventing and addressing the misuse of power by state officials or individuals holding positions within state institutions.

The checks and balances mechanism in a democracy is not only natural but also essential. It serves to prevent the abuse of power by an individual or institution and to avoid the concentration of power in a single entity. Through this mechanism, institutions can monitor, supervise, and even complement one another, fostering a balanced and accountable governance system.

Examining the executive-legislative relationship post-election, it is evident that presidents in nearly every administration tend to build political support in the House of Representatives (DPR). This tendency stems from the assumption that political security in the DPR can foster governmental stability. However, achieving this is no easy task, as the fragmented nature of Indonesia's party system, characterized by an extreme multiparty composition in the DPR, often compels the elected president to form a large coalition.

The formation of a large (oversized) coalition<sup>23</sup> is often legitimized as a prerequisite for governmental stability, yet this justification is not entirely valid. Large coalitions bring about significant political risks and complex constitutional issues. Three fundamental problems arise as consequences of forming such coalitions within a presidential system. First, governance tends to become overly compromising. The blending of executive and legislative powers makes the president highly accommodative to the interests of political parties. This situation is further exacerbated by the rent-seeking and transactional nature of the party system. Ministerial positions are often distributed through "horse-trading" politics, where appointments are based on political negotiations rather than merit".<sup>24</sup>

Such conditions indirectly undermine the president's prerogative in appointing and selecting ministerial-level officials within the presidential system. The president's accommodative approach toward the DPR creates a reciprocal,

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<sup>23</sup> Stephen D. Fisher dan Sara B. Hobolt, "Coalition government and electoral accountability," *Electoral Studies*, Special Symposium: Voters and Coalition Governments, 29, no. 3 (1 September 2010): 358–69, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2010.03.003>.

<sup>24</sup> Idul Rishan, "Risiko Koalisi Gemuk dalam Sistem Presidensial di Indonesia", *Jurnal Hukum Ius Quia Iustum* 27, no. 27 (mei 2020): 220.

overly compromising relationship between the two branches. This dynamic poses significant risks to the administration of government, as it weakens and compromises the DPR's oversight function, rendering it ineffective and lacking objectivity.

Under Jokowi's administration, the DPR's political oversight function has not been effectively exercised. For instance, efforts to initiate an interpellation regarding the increase in fuel prices were thwarted by the overwhelming majority of government supporters in the DPR. The stance of factions that consistently endorse all government actions reflects a strategic choice to maintain their position within the power structure. This reality underscores that a large coalition blurs the parliamentary role in oversight, including effectively closing the door to impeachment, as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (*UUDN RI*).

Moreover, a large coalition does not necessarily guarantee governmental stability, particularly in the relationship between the President and the DPR. From the perspective of the legislative function, majority support does not correlate directly with the number of draft bills (RUU) passed into law. This indicates that a large coalition does not ensure improved legislative performance.

Fundamentally, the elected president faces challenges in controlling the stance of political parties regarding government programs and policies. Within a large parliamentary coalition, there exists an ambivalence among party members, who are polarized between two interests. On one hand, party members strive to align with the government's position, but on the other, they must also consider the interests of their party leaders. This duality prevents a large coalition from automatically guaranteeing governmental stability.

A large coalition can become a trap for authoritarianism. With the majority of political parties in the DPR aligned with the government, the President not only becomes the epicenter of executive power but also emerges as the controller of the political parties in parliament. This tendency makes the government vulnerable to falling into an authoritarian regime. Levitsky and Ziblatt's analysis is particularly relevant in illustrating this condition: the absence of a legislative role in

overseeing the executive becomes a symptom of the rise of demagogic leaders. Democracy deteriorates and regresses.

The opposition's role as a watchdog weakens due to offers of positions, assistance, rewards, and business opportunities. It is no surprise that during the early periods of SBY's and Jokowi's second terms, the issue of extending the presidential term limit repeatedly emerged. The opportunity to lobby for changes to Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution (*UUDN RI*) remains open, given that the incumbent president enjoys the support of a parliamentary majority. The merging of legislative and executive powers causes political parties to be reluctant to distance themselves from the center of power.<sup>25</sup>

Judging by the substantial support from political parties in the DPR at the time, the pro-government coalition can be categorized as a large coalition. However, internally, this coalition proved to be fragile. One of the main reasons for this fragility is that the coalition was based on a political contract, formed primarily to secure the continuity of governance. The downside of such weak cohesion and solidarity within the coalition is that the support of political parties for the government often depends on the individual or partisan interests of politicians or political parties within the coalition.

The DPR during the 2019–2024 period faces significant challenges in fulfilling its oversight and opposition roles. In an ideal presidential system, there should be two main forces that balance each other. This balance is crucial to ensure that, despite the large government coalition, the DPR continues to perform its oversight function and uphold the principle of checks and balances. Lobbying activities are an essential aspect that must be strengthened in the legislative process and in overseeing the government. Ideally, lobbying to critique the government should be initiated by opposition parties. However, since lobbying is informal in nature, oversight and criticism of government performance can also be carried out by any DPR member, whether from coalition or non-coalition parties.

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<sup>25</sup> Idul Rishan 233.

It is hoped that lobbying within the DPR can uncover opportunities for parties to encourage the formulation of sound and effective government policies.<sup>26</sup>

This is particularly important because, during the 2019–2024 period, there are several key government agendas that require critical oversight from the DPR. In the economic sector, the government must focus on increasing economic growth, reducing poverty, and improving public welfare. In the security sector, the rise of radicalism, which has occasionally led to acts of terrorism, demands intensive attention from both the government and the DPR. Therefore, in carrying out its duties and functions, the DPR is expected to become a strong institution capable of balancing executive power. This is especially crucial given that the presidential system mandated by the amendments to the 1945 Constitution (*UUD NRI 1945*) was influenced by the New Order era, which was characterized by an excessive concentration of power in the presidency.

## **Conclusion**

The incorporation of major opposition parties into the government coalition has adversely affected the state of democracy in Indonesia. The ruling coalition exploits this situation to secure support from former opposition parties, which further consolidates the government’s power in shaping policy decisions. Conversely, the former opposition parties use this opportunity to secure positions and influence within the government. While the principle of checks and balances has continued to operate post-2019 election, it has been largely ineffective. This ineffectiveness is due to the diminished presence of opposition parties, resulting in draft bills initiated by the executive branch being passed in parliament without significant debate or rigorous scrutiny. The dominance of the government coalition in parliament undermines the legislative process, making it susceptible to unchecked decision-making. To prevent such abuses of power in the legislative process, particularly due to the large pro-government coalition, it is crucial to restore the legislative function as outlined in the constitution. The erosion of this

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<sup>26</sup> Debora Sanur, “Keberadaan Koalisi Dan Oposisi dalam Kinerja DPR RI 2019-2024, Jurnal Parliamentary Review” 169.

function impacts the practice of governance. Additionally, restructuring the relationship between the president and political parties through legal reforms is essential to ensure balanced and effective governance.

### Author Contribution

Frenki is responsible for the planning and implementation of the research, from preparing the proposal, data collection, and analysis to writing the initial draft of the article manuscript. Hervin Yoki Pradikta supervises and completes data comprehensive proofreading and translates it into English.

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